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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ETH-
NOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.'
BY THE LATE JUSTICE ALBERT HERMANN POST.
ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE, the most recent branch
of the science of law, so richly elaborated by every method of
research, has still to battle for its existence. Wide circles in the
world of juridical learning utterly ignore it, or assume a hostile
and at best sceptical attitude towards it. Neither the history of
law nor the philosophy of jurisprudence has accorded it scientific
recognition, and even the tenability of the principles upon which
it is based has been characterised as highly questionable.
It is universally true that every new departure in science at
first meets with opposition, and that it cannot aspire to recogni-
tion until it is in a position to present results that are incontrover-
tible. Only by presenting such results can it acquire recognised
standing in the roll of the sciences, and only by the elaboration of
these results can it repel definitively the attacks directed against
it. But this process may be expedited by giving in the clearest
and most explicit terms possible a sketch of its underlying princi-
ples, and so in the present case, while ethnological jurisprudence
is still in the initial stages of its development, it will not be amiss,
in the interests of our study, to attempt a substantiation of its sci-
entific pretensions. We shall, by so doing, at least throw obsta-
cles in the way of superficial criticism from the traditional stand-
point.
Ethnological jurisprudence stands in marked contrast with the
tendencies that at present dominate the science of law. Its method
of procedure is fundamentally inductive, and has for its starting-
1 Translated from the German by Thomas J. McCormack
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point the customs and juraP concepts of all the nations of the earth.
Its method furthermore is specifically comparative-ethnological;
that is to say, it is on the one hand socio-psychological and on the
other hand comparative in the sense that it proceeds by compari-
son even where the historical connexion between the facts of the
jural life is lacking.
It is thus opposed to
—
1. Every philosophy of jurisprudence which is essentially de-
ductive in its methods.
2. Every system of jurisprudence founded upon the law of a
single nation or a single group of nations.
3. Every system of jurisprudence which is individuo-psycho-
logical in its origin.
4. All investigations of historical jurisprudence which on prin
ciple do not quit the ground of historical connexion in the treat-
ment of the facts of jural life.
These innovations have given to ethnological jurisprudence its
peculiar impress, and it is this peculiarity that demands scientific
vindication.
The first point of view that presents itself for the examination
of the jural order is unquestionably the individuo-psychological.
For the domain of jural life comprehends the action of the forces
that emanate from individuals, and the law finds its most immedi-
ate expression in the jural sense of the individual. It is daily born
anew in the depths of the human soul. Here it appears in the
form of passion and desire, so soon as a misdeed is committed,
and urges to vengeance and expiation. The written law of statute-
books and the courts, however, is but the mediate expression of
the jural life.
The first point of view presenting itself is therefore the follow-
ing: to regard all jural order as the product of the differences and
coincidences of the jural sense of human individuals, and to en-
deavor to explain the same from the nature of man, that is, from
the nature of the individual.
This idea still rules supreme in modern jurisprudence. We
meet on all sides with arguments explanatory of state and law,
which are derived from the nature of the human individual. And
seeing that the individuo-psychological method of investigation
derives its materials directly from the living source of life, while
1 "By the adjeclive jural yfe shall denote that which has reference to the doctrine of rights
and obligations; as by the adjective "moral" we denote that which has reference to the doc-
trine of duties."— Whewell. (Quoted by Translator.)
i
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the socio-psychological starts from the jural phenomena of the life
of all nations, deriving thence its inductions as to the causes which
underlie the same, certainly, if it were possible to explain jural life
adequately from the nature of the human individual, the individuo-
psychological method would have the preference.
But this latter method does not lead far towards the under-
standing of jural life. The sequence of causes soon vanishes in so
inaccessible a sphere as the personality of the individual, and true
scientific inquiry is displaced by ingenuity and sophistry.
Viewed from the individuo-psychological standpoint, the facts
of jural life are partly matter of our subjective and partly matter of
our objective experience.
Matter of subjective experience is merely our own individual
jural sense, that is our individual consciousness as bearing upon
right and wrong. This individual jural sense is made up of a sum-
total of psychical activities, of which we become conscious when
from inward or outward excitation we are confronted with the ques-
tion as to whether something is right or wrong. These psychical
activities are partly feelings and desires, and partly judgments, the
former tending towards action and the latter tending towards ex-
pression by word or sign. Jural feelings are principally feelings of
indignation as when an injustice is experienced by an individual, a
feeling of fear as when the individual is affected by an inclination
to do wrong, a feeling of penitence as when the individual has com-
mitted a wrong. With the feeling of indignation is joined a desire
for vengeance, with the feeling of penitence a desire of atonement,
the former tending towards an act of vengeance and the latter
towards an act of expiation. The jural judgments of individuals
are not complete judgments; they are based upon an undefined
sense of right and wrong. In the consciousness of the individual
there exists no standard of right and wrong under which every sin-
gle circumstance giving rise to the formation of a jural judgment
can be subsumed. A simple instinct impels the individual to de-
clare an action right or wrong.
It thus becomes evident that the individuo-psychological anal-
ysis of the individual jural sense, in so far as it rests upon subjec-
tive experience, can afford only meagre results. All psychical
phenomena of the jural sense are, so far as regards our subjective
experience, ready-made products. The psychological development
of jural emotions, desires, and judgments, is not accessible to our
inner experience. The psychological processes whereby we be-
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come conscious of jural emotions, desires, and judgments, lie
without the reach of consciousness.
Further, subjective observation of the psychical processes
from which the jural sense springs, bears the same character as
subjective observation of psychical processes generally. System-
atic self-observation is impossible, inasmuch as the observing sub-
ject and the observed object are one and the same, and the very
act of observing thus modifies the object observed.^ It is likewise
impossible to evoke, arbitrarily or artificially, a jural desire or an
instinctive jural judgment; they always appear instantaneously
and unbidden in consciousness. As material for observation, ac-
cordingly, there remains only the recollection of such occurrences
in the mind of the individual.
Still another drawback to the employment of subjective obser-
vation for scientific inquiry is the fact, that it is almost utterly im-
possible to distinguish in general between jural feelings, desires,
and judgments, and moral feelings, desires, and judgments.
Scientific inquiry attains more favorable results when it
adopts as the subject of investigation the expressions of the in-
dividual jural conscience in the external world of sense—that is,
the phenomena of the individual jural sense as appearing in acts
on the one hand and in words and signs on the other. Here self-
observation discovers facts which are represented as events in the
outward world of sense, and which are consequently subject to ex-
ternal observation. True, the observation of the outward expres-
sions of the individual jural conscience in acts, words, and signs
affords scarcely more material for the psychological analysis of the
individual jural sense than the direct inward observation of the
same. The material for observation increases, however, if the ob-
server, not confining himself to the expressions of his own jural
sense, compares with these the expressions of the jural sense of
other people, or even compares the expressions of the jural sense
of other people with each other.
From this method dissimilarities in the phenomena of the ju-
ral consciousness appear at once, and these are in a high degree
adapted to throw light upon its nature. In the first place it is pos-
sible to distinguish differences in the jural sense of individuals
according to their ages. It is possible to follow the jural sense
of children in its development. We are also able to fix degrees
of jural sense in youth and manhood, perhaps too in old age.
iComte, Positive Philosophy, abridged by Rig ; German translation by Kirchmann, 1883, I. p.
13 ff. Wundt, Loeih, 1883, II., p. 482.
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It will be possible, furthermore, to point out variations of jural
sense between the male and female sexes. Then further, there
are to be noted marked irregularities of jural sense resulting from
derangement j which derangement may rest on biological as well
as sociological causes. Mental diseases, affecting the whole con-
sciousness of the individual, affect the jural sense also. Besides
these, there are a great number of persons whose jural sense,
though not disturbed by any psychical disarrangement, is far be-
low the normal state ; namely, criminals. Such persons, endowed
with a jural sense of a socio-pathological kind, furnish the mate-
rial for a separate branch of psychology; viz., criminal psychol-
ogy. Marked irregularities in the individual jural sense may be
further distinguished according to the social circle in which the in-
dividual moves. Even in a single nation these irregularities are
quite considerable ; according to caste, culture, occupation, poli-
tics, religion, and the like. Yet the most considerable deviations
are to be found between the jural consciences of different peoples,
and they are more considerable according as the difference in civ-
ilisation is greater, or as the development of the same has been
more unique.
In all these ways it would be possible to observe the expres-
sions of the individual jural sense and by a process of individuo-
psychological comparison to arrive at scientific results. It is evi-
dent, though, that it would be difficult to collect the material for
observation, and that the observations of individuals themselves to
this end would be subject to innumerable sources of error.
These observations could not acquire scientific value unless
made upon the most extensive plan, and with persons of different
ages, different sex, different intellectual ability, different social
standing, and different nationality; and unless the material accu-
mulated were so considerable that all the sources of error in indi-
vidual observation could be eliminated. To limit the observations
to a narrow field, would necessarily yield incorrect results ; for it
is now beyond question that the jural sense of individuals is sub-
ject to the most varied differentiations. The most distorted pre-
sentation of all, however, is produced when the inquirer confines
himself mainly to his own individual jural sense, and persuades
himself that this should determine the conduct of humanity. He
has here merely systematised his own jural consciousness; mani-
festly a doleful scientific result.
How is it possible to observe the manifestations of the indi-
vidual jural sense, which appear only instinctively and occasion-
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ally, exhaustively enough to obtain really valuable scientific mate-
rial for a causal analysis of the jural order? It is unquestionably
hopeless.
And even were it possible to proceed thus, we should be far
from exhausting in this way the data of jural life. Jural life, as a
social province, is by no means made up of immediate expressions
of the individual jural sense only; there are also mediate and indi-
rect expressions of the same in it. The positive laws of nations
with their statutes and provisions, have, it is true, their first origin
in the expressions of the jural sense of individuals. But after these
have become positive laws they are no longer the immediate ex-
pressions of the individual jural sense, but the objective products
of the jural sense of whole spheres of social development, of count-
less individuals with variously formed jural consciences—individu-
als of existing generations as well as individuals that have long
passed away.
It would be a manifestly precarious attempt to seek the expla-
nation of these phenomena in the nature of the human individual
itself. Unlimited scope would be given to caprice and imagina-
tion.
And yet, in the face of all, this method of studying the Science
of Jurisprudence is still greatly in vogue, and meets with unquali-
fied approval from contemporary students. They endow the human
individual with certain instincts, the social instinct and the in-
stinct of self-preservation : or they will have it pursue different
ends according to its constitutional bent, happiness, liberty, etc.,
and upon these phantasms they build their structure as becomes
the kindly heart and academic culture of the philosopher. These
artistic productions are often charming reading, often teem with
clever conceits, and give us a pretty picture of how blissful all
would be, were it not so different in the world. If these works did
not claim to be more than light and entertaining reading, we might
joyfully welcome them. But they pretend to be more; they assert
that they are scientific, and would actually influence the practical
mechanism of the jural order. Herein is their danger. Ethnolo-
gical Jurisprudence, in my opinion, must stand aloof from all at-
tempts to define State and Law on the basis of individual psychol-
ogy. And now to the discussion and proof.
*
* *
It is not only in the province of Jurisprudence that we find at-
tempts to explain the phenomena of social life on the basis of
individual psychology. This method is common to all the other so-
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cial sciences. It rests upon a broad and fundamental psycholo-
gical principle, which at the present day shows signs of instability
and will sooner or later be completely overthrown.
All human science takes on a different form, according to
whether we assume that the nature of man can be determined from
his ego alone, or that the soul and ego of man are not identical
but that man is conscious of a portion only of his psychical ac-
tivity. In the first instance, the psychology of the individual is
the irreversible basis of human science ; in the second, we have to
look about us for broader foundations. Ethnology, and likewise
ethnological jurisprudence, is founded upon the second view. It
assumes that, in the individual consciousness, only a small portion
of his psychical activity is manifest to the individual and that the
greater part is lost to his consciousness. It regards individual
psychology, therefore, as no proper basis of science.
That which we call our consciousness is in any case but an in-
finitesimally small portion of the totality of psychic life active
within us. It hovers like a tenuous and shimmering cloud above an
unfathomable ocean. All manner of images rise from the depths
of our soul, yet few assume such sharpness of contour as to be rec-
ognised. By far the greater portion of our spiritual life remains
unknown to us. By far the greatest portion of the spiritual life of
which we are conscious, is known to us only as the resultant product
of unconscious psychical processes, and not as something in process
of production. We remain totally unconscious of those spiritual
activities which touch most nearly the vital centre of our being, the
activities which create on the one side an ego and on the other a
world. At the instant a child first becomes conscious of itself, the
ego and the world are already existent : their birth is concomitant
with the act of consciousness. The unconscious activities of the
soul have shaped them, until, appearing as ready-formed pro-
ducts, they give rise to that radical contrariety by which man be-
comes conscious of himself and a world. We remain utterly un-
conscious, too, of those psychical workings which give to the
world its sensible character and to the ego its spiritual. Our world,
in every phase in which it is accessible to us, is virtually a pro-
duct of psychical activities acting unconsciously within us. Light,
heat, color, sound, taste, smell, pressure, weight, even space and
time, do not belong to the world as such : on the contrary they
are creations of mental activities, corresponding to the psycho-
logical activities of our sensory and central organs, and project
without a world created within.
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Rokitansky^ expresses himself upon this subject as follows :
"We see the world that surrounds us by means of light ; but
it is now known that light does not exist as such apart from us ;
on the contrary it is vibrations of ether, which we transpose into
light, and recognise as such, by means of mechanisms of specific
irritability located beyond the sensory organs proper. Thus we
ourselves illuminate space and come to know things therein
through their relation to light ; we acquire knowledge not only as
to their surface and outlines, but also as to their inner constitu-
tion. It is likewise the vibrations of sounding bodies of different
magnitude and velocity, taken up and communicated to us by the
air, that we convert into sound and tone. And so, too, the things
which we perceive through impressions upon the other senses,
are, apart from our conception of them, quite different, and un-
doubtedly consist of the molecular or molar motions of matter. It
must strike every impartial person as strange that we recognise as
external objects things of which the conception is really formed
within us. How does this come? There is undoubtedly a subjec-
tive organic activity present here.
" This much is known : that the impelling power in obedience
to which we project objects conceived, outside the subject conceiv-
ing them, must lie in the inward organisation of the mind ; that
the conception of things in space is a function of the organs of our
cognitive faculty which even in dreams creates in our imagination
an external world.
"The perceptible world about us is essentially a creation of our
personality; it is by the functioning of inner organs that objects
appear as things outside of us, as things of definite quality and
form, of definite size and greatness. Further, when we behold in
the genesis of things and in their different stages and mutations a
succession and a connexion, we say that the succession takes place
in time and that the connexion between the changes is a causal one.
But when we ask ourselves how we arrive at these conclusions, it
turns out that we do so by virtue of subjective forms which must
lie in our organisation and by means of which we are in fact ena-
bled to apprehend successions and connexions."
Even the world that remains after we remove the mantle of
sensible phenomena, the world of ether and matter vibrations, is
still not the world proper ; it is the world only as it appears to hu-
man cognitive activity.
\Der selbst. IVerih des Wissens, 1869, p. 6, et seq.
ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE. 649
The psychical operations, too, that create our ego are totally
hidden from us.
And even the greater part of those psychical operations of
which we are conscious, are presented to consciousness as finished
products, the genesis of which took place in unconsciousness. Ra-
tiocination alone is effected wholly in consciousness. Feelings and
desires come to consciousness as results only, and many judgments
are not logical judgments, but incompleted ones, lying, with the
principle upon which they were formed, in the province of the un-
conscious.
If all this be correct, it is evident that our consciousness is in
no wise fitted for the thorough comprehension of human nature
;
for only an insignificant portion of our spiritual life ever becomes
immediately conscious. What we are able to fathom by self-con-
templation is soon exhausted. Yet unlimited is the province of
knowledge that opens before us, if to the inward observation of
self we add outward observation by the senses ; in other words, if,
from the phenomena of unconscious psychic life as expressed in
the outward world of sense, we draw inferences as to the uncon-
scious activities at work within us.
To this end the whole sensible world presents itself. Our sen-
sible world is not the real world-in-itself. It is merely a world-
image, made by man, created by human psychical activities. From
this, therefore, we shall be able to gather a great part of our un-
conscious psychical life, and thus come infinitely nearer the es-
sence of our being than would be possible through the introspec-
tive observation of our own psychical activities.
In this way we arrive, not at the psychology of the past, which
attempted to unfold the nature of man from the ego, but at a psy-
chology which will endeavor to disclose the same from the world-
image created by man.
*
* *
Among the phenomena of our sensible world which admit of
inferences as to unconscious psychical activities, the phenomena
of social life assume a prominent place.
And social life, though made up of the activities of individu-
als, supposably in possession of free will, is also essentially in-
stinctive, resting upon the more or less unconscious impulses of
the individual. Whosoever has had to do with the more intricate
problems of ethnology, will entertain no doubt whatever of this
fact.
Turn where we will in the domain of social life, we shall every-
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where see fixed social laws at work, everywhere meet with a ten-
dency of development, which leading through centuries and centu-
ries, makes towards some definite end, and of whose aims the
individuals comprehended in the movement have no idea. Con-
template the history of the growth of language, the development
of forms of divinity, of art, of legal institutions, even of fashions
and utensils ; they come, grow, and go, like things of life. There
is but little here that is the product of individual reflexion ; almost
everything is of organic growth. The individual follows blind im-
pulses and coercive social conditions ; the individual most fre-
quently intends the very opposite of what he produces by his work,
and all that he does accomplish, unless fitting in with the course of
organic development, will soon come to naught.
That the individual in social life acts for the most part in-
stinctively, we may ascertain by self- observation and by the obser-
vation of other individuals. A man, in speaking to another, em-
ploys the words he needs quite instinctively; they come to him, as
a rule, without further reflexion. He need not know anything of
the grammar of the language he speaks, and yet may employ the
language with the greatest ease. A man who is confronted with
the question whether he is acting advantageously or not, whether
he is committing an act of justice or injustice, generally decides
from pure instinct, occasionally from feeling, but seldom through
clear reasoning, and then always liable to the danger of mistake.
A poem, a melody, a picture, a statue, arises before the mind's eye
of an artist : something comes to him. Not until something comes
to him, can he elaborate it further by thought. Creations that are
not unconsciously born in the artist are not works of art, although
every artifice of aesthetic manipulation have been employed. Every
original and powerful idea in science is born of unconsciousness
like a stroke of lightning.
We need but glance at every-day life to become convinced of
how instinctive in its workings the whole mechanism of human ex-
istence is. Take the habits and customs of ordinary social life.
When do we ever hear of reasons for acting in this manner or in
that. We act so because things are not otherwise than they are,
because we must, because others do so. We all know how impos-
sible it is to convince a person who can advance no reasons for his
conduct, that his way of thinking is wrong. If there were a possi-
ble prospect of being able to do this in the case of a man, it would
certainly fail with a woman, whose springs of life are pre-eminently
more instinctive than man's. In fact, a man who does not act and
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live instinctively is ridiculed and despised : he is no longer capable
of inspiration and enthusiasm for any cause.
The deposits, therefore, of the unconscious workings of the
human mind in the customs and conceptions of nations, are a
source of incalculable importance to the understanding of the hu-
man soul; and the history of social activity furnishes an infinitely
more copious material to this end than could be obtained by in-
trospection and observation of the psychical life of a single human
individual. An important part of our psychical life, which for the
most part does not directly appear in consciousness, can thus be
gathered from the customs and conceptions of the peoples of the
earth.
Our statements as to consciousness in general are likewise true
of the jural sense. The jural sense by no means exhausts the to-
tality of psychical processes which constitute the jural life of a
man. More properly, the majority of these processes come into
the jural consciousness as results, as feelings and desires, or as in-
stinctive jural judgments; while the genesis of these psychical
formations are hidden in unconsciousness. But in the jural insti-
tutions and conceptions of nations a great deal of jural life comes
to light that remains unknown to the individual, and so it is possi-
ble to penetrate much farther by this method into the cognition of
the human mind in its jural aspects than was possible by the obser-
vation of one's own jural sense or by observing the expressions of
the jural sense of single individuals.
But apart from this broad psychological standpoint, the very
nature of Law itself indicates that the individuo-psychological
method can lead to nothing, and that only the socio-psychological
method can produce satisfactory results. It will appear on closer
observation that the individual jural sense is not the creator of the
jural order, but on the contrary, that the individual jural sense is a
product of law as a sphere of social life. Only in so far as the ju-
ral sense is consciousness per se are we concerned with a biological
basis; in so far, however, as it is a jural consciousness, the foun-
dation is sociological. The human consciousness has a physical
basis in the central organs of the body, but we should search in
vain in the human body for an organ that is the seat of the moral
or jural sense. A human being, reared in a state of perfect isola-
tion, would think because he possessed a brain and had to use it
in the struggle with nature. But we should find no trace of a
moral sense or a jural sense in such a person. They are both the
exclusive product of life in human society. They first arise through
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adaptation to the social relations in which men live, and not until
this adaptation is perfected does human consciousness acquire,
among innumerable other notions, conceptions of right and wrong,
of rights and obligations.
The jural order, therefore, is not to be explained from the na-
ture of the human individual, but from the nature of the social
bodies in which it has been evolved. And it is only from this
source that the individual jural sense also becomes intelligible.
Although the jural sense acts purely from instinct within us, it
is nevertheless the creation of social and not of individual factors.
This will appear from the fact that it acts in opposition to individ-
ual inclination. How are we to find one biological basis for the
two psychical forces that come into conflict when the individual
becomes possessed of an inclination to commit a crime and his
jural sense restrains him from it ? And if there be no biological
basis, then the psychological theory that a person can control his
sensuous inclinations by the innate rational faculty rests upon im-
agination. In reality the controlling element here is not a biolo-
gical or an individuo-psychological factor, it is a socio-psychological
one.
The most telling proof that the individual jural sense is not a
biological but a sociological product is found in the circumstance
that, apart from the changes it suffers as consciousness proper
(through age, insanity, etc.), its content is determined by the char-
acter of the social community in which the individual lives or has
grown up. Were this not the case the jural sense of Frenchmen,
Germans, Russians, and Chinese, who hnd attained the same de-
gree of intellectual culture, would be one and the same. But this
is obviously not the case. Identity of jural sense means identity of
social organisation.
The individuo-psychological standpoint, accordingly, is inade-
quate for the explanation of the facts of jural life and we must ex-
pect really valuable scientific results only from a socio-psychologi-
cal analysis of jural phenomena.
The socio-psychological method proceeds, in its investigation
of the causes of jural life, not from the human individual, but from
the forms which Law assumes in society, from jural customs, jural
conceptions, and jural institutions as they are met with in the life
of nations themselves. All these forms arose originally from ex-
pressions of the individual jural sense, and these expressions are
in their turn founded upon social instincts developed by life in hu-
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man society. By frequent repetition and the elimination of con-
crete notions, these expressions gradually lose their individual
character. They become expressions of the corporate jural sense
of a concrete sphere of social development. In this way a nation
acquires a set of jural customs and jural conceptions, which regu-
late its acts and judgments, and whose conservation is entrusted to
the government of the social sphere in which they were evolved.
In this so-called positive law, the organic law of a nation assumes
an objective form. It is a precipitate, in a social shape, of the
jural sense, just as religious rites, forms of divinity, and doctrinal
faith are the precipitates of the religious sense, or human language
of human thought. In the positive law of a definite epoch lies,
essentially, the normal jural sense of the totality of individuals
embraced within a single sphere of social development, as founded
upon the jural order transmitted from previous generations.
These positive laws constitute the combined data of the socio-
psychological investigations of jural life ; and they are full of prom-
ise. In the evolution of positive laws the creative national genius
has instinctively accomplished a scientific work, such as could only
be obtained by thoroughly analysing the utterances of the jural
sense of all the individuals that now live or ever have lived within
the social sphere governed by the positive law in question.
The study of the individual jural sense is thus in reality un-
necessary, and the science of jurisprudence may begin at once
with the analysis of positive laws.
The question now arises as to what method of conducting the
analysis of jural life, as a field of social activity, will be most pro-
ductive of results. And this question we shall answer in our sec-
ond and concluding article.
